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FRANÇOISE BALIBAR 
What Is a Thing? 
 
 
I am not going to comment on Heidegger’s Die Frage nach dem Ding : I lack 
the skills and education for that. The reason for choosing such a title is that 
Heidegger’s views on theoretical physics, as they are expressed in this series of 
lectures delivered in 1935-36, seem to me the best way to introduce the subject of 
my talk the aim of which is to describe how contemporary physics (meaning 
physics in the last fifty years, from the 1960s on) deals with the eternally reworked 
concept of res (chose, thing, Ding) 
Let me briefly sketch out what Heidegger says. Looking for what can be 
considered specific to modern science (i.e. post- Galilean science), Heidegger finds 
it in its mathematical character – which looks like a common statement, but 
appears more complicated and sophisticated after closer examination. More 
precisely, although Heidegger (in Sein und Zeit, 1929) had already described  modern 
science as a “mathematical sketch or draft (Entwurf) of nature,” he now (that is, in 
1935, after some rather rough  discussions with Cassirer) realizes that there is more 
to it: the fundamental characteristic of modern science, that which distinguishes it 
from both ancient and medieval science, is neither its claim to deal with facts, nor 
its emphasis on experiment  and numerical measurements, but rather the discovery 
that mathematics has something to do with things, that mathematics “meets” 
things : “Mathematics is concerned with things, although from a specific 
perspective” [Das Mathematische betrifft die Dinge und zwar in einer bestimmten Hinsicht]1 
                                                
1  . Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1962, 54.  Martin Heidegger, What is 
a Thing? Trans. Deutsch, Barton, Gendlin. New York: Gateway, 1968,  70. 
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Heidegger’s view cannot, and must not, be reduced to the usual statement 
that modern science aims at a “mathematization of Nature”. As a matter of fact, 
the expression “mathematization of Nature” can be given at least two different 
meanings. A first meaning relies on the idea of a representation: mathematics 
(through theoretical physics) gives a picture of the “real” world – an idea that needs 
to be complemented by a statement of what kind of picture is meant. For Heinrich 
Hertz (1857-1894) for example, whose work was very influential at that time, the 
idea is that we form, not exactly pictures, Bilder, but simulacra, (Scheinbilder) of 
things (Gegenstände), such that the relations between, let us say two, Scheinbilder (or 
Symbolen), reproduce the relations among the things they represent.2 This first 
meaning of mathematization as representation is the one advocated by Cassirer: it 
implies that there exists such a thing as a “mathematical science of Nature” in 
which Nature itself is symbolically depicted. This is not Heidegger’s view.  
Heidegger has a more profound understanding of the way mathematics intervenes 
in physics, and thus in Nature ;  things  -- he says -- are not represented by 
mathematics ; they are “viewed and spoken of mathematically” [mathematisch 
angesehen und angesprochen].  
The question then is: what is the perspective from which they are thus 
genommen, “grasped” or “seized.”  “In what respect are things taken when they are 
viewed and spoken of mathematically?” [In welcher Hinsicht sind die Dinge genommen, 
wenn Sie mathematisch angesehen und angesprochen werden?]3 asks Heidegger. Nature, it 
would seem, vanishes. Nature is no longer the collection of things (or phenomena) 
involved in the previous meaning of “mathematization” and knowing is not taking 
a picture, or a photograph which reproduces the relations among things. According 
to Heidegger’s view of theoretical physics, a perspective or Hinsicht is introduced, with 
the obvious drawback of thereby introducing a distortion (especially as relations 
among things are concerned), since a perspective is in itself a distortion.  Sure 
enough, there is such a risk but, says Heidegger, it is worth taking; in fact, we 
                                                
2 The metaphor is that of a token which stands for a coat in a cloakroom. 
3 Frage, 54; What is a Thing, 70. 
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cannot do otherwise. For mathematics touches upon things and this must be taken 
into account, no matter what the drawbacks.   
So we do not see Nature “as it is” but from the point of view of 
mathematics. Nature itself has been replaced by “the book of Nature, written .as 
everybody knows (see Galileo) in “characters [which] are triangles, circles, and 
other geometrical figures.”4 And here, the whole passage from Il saggiatore should be 
quoted : 
“Philosophy is written in this vast book, which lies continuously open before 
our eyes (I mean the universe). But it cannot be understood unless you have 
first learned to understand the language and recognize the characters in which 
it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters 
are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures. Without such means, it is 
impossible for us humans to understand a word of it, and to be without them 
is to wander around in vain through a dark labyrinth.”  
Galileo does insist repeatedly on the fact that we are impelled in that direction, and 
that there is no other way. In the Dialogo he argues that “It must be admitted that 
he who undertakes to deal with questions of natural sciences without the help of 
geometry is attempting the unfeasible.”  
So the question Heidegger is asking becomes what does reading the book of 
Nature (and not Nature itself), written in geometrical language, imply?What does it 
change? The answer is clear and simple: geometry introduces space. Things, as we 
“see” them through the perspective of mathematics, no longer exist by themselves, 
they are part of a geometrical construction. They are not vorhanden (present-at-
hand), they are zuhanden (ready- to- hand). Things are, so to speak, embedded in 
space; they cannot be disentangled from space. Or, in other words, things are 
“grasped” by mathematics, using the tool of space to grasp them – just as we grasp 
sugar cubes with a pair of tongs. Or, more appropriately, they are “caught” in the 
net of space, like an insect in a spider web. Although all metaphors are deficient, I 
                                                
4 Galileo, Opere 6:232.  
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think this last one is not too bad, for, as we shall see in a moment, a geometrical 
space is mathematically equivalent to a net of lines, called geodesics, of 
fundamental importance to theoretical physics. In Heidegger’s words: “Nature is 
no longer the inner principle out of which the motion of the body follows. Rather, 
nature is the mode of the variety of the changing relative positions of bodies, the 
manner in which they are present in space and time, which themselves are domains 
of possible positional orders and determinations of order and have no special traits 
anywhere.”  [Natur ist jetzt nicht mehr das, was als inneres Vermögen des Körpers diesem die 
Bewegungsform und sein Ort bestimmt. Natur ist jetzt der im axiomatischen Entwurf umrissene 
Bereich des gleichmässigen raumzeitlichen Bewegung Zusammenhanges, in der eingefûgt und 
verspannt die Körper allein Körper sein können].5  
What does Heidegger mean when he says that bodies, once caught in space 
(eingefügt und verspannt), can only be bodies (allein Körper sein können)? Obviously 
“Körper sein,” (or “be bodies”) refers to the substantial qualities of things. 
Heidegger’s “allein” (“alone” or “only”) seems to imply that, once they are caught in 
the array of space, things are free to become only corporeal, substantive, material. 
They are, so to speak. stripped of their other properties. How are we to understand 
this? Because, from Galileo’s time up to 1850, the space in which things are caught 
could only be Euclidean space, that is, homogeneous and isotropic space,  we are 
led to the conclusion that through this process of capture, the qualities of things, 
which  a priori must be an intricate combination of spatiotemporal and substantial 
properties, appear, once they have been processed by geometry (as they are in the 
mathematical Entwurf),  as disentangled and divided into two categories:  spatial 
properties on one hand, substantive properties on the other. In contrast to the 
Aristotelian conception of the world where substantive properties of things were 
supposed to determine (or influence) their localization, once things are caught in 
homogeneous and isotropic Euclidean space, they become something else -- an 
                                                
5  Frage,72, What is a Thing, 88. A more accurate translation would be: “Nature is no longer that which, as inner 
capacity of the body, determines the form of its movement and its location. Nature is now the domain whose 
contours are outlined in the axiomatic project, a domain of the uniform spatiotemporal connection of movements 
such that the bodies inserted it can only be bodies. 
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object (ob-jectum) says Heidegger --something to which substantial properties can be 
attributed. The question then arises of how this can take place. In classical physics 
(post-Galilean but pre-Einsteinian), it is done in the simplest manner by ascribing 
one or more numerical coefficients to each of these objects (geometrical objects, 
i.e., the points or set of points of Euclidean geometry) which are supposed to 
encompass all spatiotemporal properties of things. Among such coefficients, mass 
is the most common: it is supposed to take into account the fact that the thing 
considered is material.  That this way of representing material properties of things 
is too simple a procedure is suggested by the fact that, at some point, physicists 
came to realize that two (and not one) coefficients need to be defined in order to 
fully account for the material properties of things: one for inertial properties (the 
resistance of matter to change of motion) and one for gravitational properties 
(matter as such attracts matter). Among other substantial coefficients, charge 
(electric charge) and potential (a quantity from which the forces acting on a “thing” 
can be deduced) are also of importance.  
  Heidegger then concludes that “Natural bodies are now only what they 
show themselves as, within this projected realm. Things now show themselves only 
in the relations of places and time points and in the measures of mass and working 
forces” [Die Naturkörper sind nur das, als was sie (the things) sich im Bereich des Entwurfs 
zeigen. Die Dinge zeigen sich jetzt nur in der Verhältnissen der Örter und Zeitpunkte 
(spatiotemporal properties), und den Maben der Masse und der wirkenden Kräfte (material 
qualities).]”6  
Note the “nur” (die Dinge sind nur das—Natural bodies or things are now only 
what--) which suggests that things are reduced to objects to which coefficients are 
attached. This is no surprise since, as noted above, this procedure corresponds to a 
certain inevitably distorted perspective. “What remains questionable in all this is a 
closer determination of  the relation of the mathematical in the sense of 
mathematics to the intuitive direct perceptual experience of the given things and to 
                                                
6 Frage. 72 What is a Thing, 93. Heidegger refers here to forces acting on the object, which physicists generally take 
into account by means of what they call a “potential”.  
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these things themselves” [Fraglich bleibt dabei, die nähere Bestimmung des verhältnisses des 
mathematisches im Sinne der Mathematik zur anschaulichen Erfahrung der gegebene Dinge und 
zu diesen selbst].7 One might even think that things, rather than being incompletely 
described by this treatment, come out of it severely injured – even dead, why not? 
Which recalls Count Zaroff ’s famous reply (in the 1932 film adaptation of “The 
Most Dangerous Game”): “First kill, then love.” In a similar way, the motto of 
classical physics, as far as bodies are concerned, could be: Give them a 
mathematical existence (kill them as things), then make the corpses look like bodies 
by decorating them – so that you can interact with them as if they were things. 
 
That is how we feel today; we have no problem with the fact that catching 
things by means of a geometrical perspective produces a distortion. But for more 
than two centuries, space was not a problem. Time even less. Space was conceived 
as a kind of “vanishing mediator” (a special interpretation of that famous 
expression taken out of its original context), an ideal pair of tongs which catches 
things without disturbing them in any way. As Heidegger says space was supposed 
to be a perfect tool: the mathematical, is, as mental conception, a project (Entwurf) 
of thingness (Dingheit which, as it were,   
skips over the things. [Das Mathematische ist, als mente concipere, ein über die Dinge 
gleichsam  hinweg springender Entwurf ihrer Dingheit].8 
What does Heidegger mean? What is thingness (Dingheit)?  (in French 
Dingheit is translated by choséité)? And how is the skipping metaphor (hinweg springend) 
to be understood? Why is Euclidean space so suitable for grasping the Dingheit of 
things? 
 
**** 
                                                
7 Frage, 73, What is a Thing, 93-94.   
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Space 
To respond requires a closer examination of the role of space.  
A major change in theoretical physics was introduced by Riemann’s 
Habilitationsvortrag, written in 1854, issued in 1867, “Über die Hypothesen, welche der 
Geometrie zu Grunde liegen” (On the Hypotheses that Lie at the Foundation of 
Geometry).9  One usually thinks of Riemann as the mathematician who 
revolutionized geometry, making it possible for non-Euclidian geometries to 
develop. This is an incomplete and partial view. For classical physics being what it 
was in the middle of the nineteenth century --i.e., based on the above description of 
things as caught in Euclidean space -- a revolution in geometry necessarily meant a 
revolution in physics: both the objectivity of the latter (physics) and the validity of 
its proofs carried on “more geometrico” had relied on the former (geometry). As is 
documented in his private papers, Riemann’s motivations in writing his 
Habilitationsvortrag were, as we know now, related to his concern about physics. 
More precisely, Riemann was trying to construct a mathematical concept of field, a 
task James Clerk Maxwell was also aiming at, more or less at the same time.  
Being an adept of the so-called philosophy of nature, Riemann denied the 
Kantian idea of space as a given entity, a “pure intuition of the mind,” and 
attempted to mathematically construct the concept of space: “It is known that 
geometry assumes, as things given, both the notion of space and the first principles 
of constructions in space”  [Bekantlich setzt die Geometrie, sowohl den Begriff des Raumes 
als die ersten Grundbegriffe für die Constructionnen im Raume, als etwas Gegebenes voraus].10 
Building a concept of space from scratch is achieved in two steps. First, Riemann 
invents the general notion of a “multiply extended magnitude” (which he calls a 
“manifold,” Mannigfaltigkeit), then, he asks the question: how can physical space (as 
the set of possible positions of objects and therefore things) be characterized as a 
special case of such a general magnitude? He sees this selection process, as an 
                                                
9 Bernhard Riemann, On the Hypotheses that Lie at the Foundation of Geometry.  
 < http://www.emis.de/classics/Riemann/WKCGeom.pdf> 
10 Riemann, p. 1. 
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iterative process of specification based on experience (Erfahrung), i.e., he singles out 
some observed regularities (he calls them “Tatsachen”, translated into English as 
“matters of facts”) displayed by physical space, which will determine (i.e. 
mathematically specify) physical space. This specification is achieved in successive 
steps, each “matter of fact” implying a specific restriction or selection among all 
possible manifolds, out of which another “matter of fact” will select a more 
restricted class of manifolds, and so on, up to the end, that is a full determination 
(eindeutig Bestimmung). Physical space is thus a work in progress: it is constructed by 
adding successive hypotheses of empirical origin, each of which implies a 
mathematical restriction on the general concept of manifold.  
 Let me emphasize how far we are from the idea of a given space, Euclidean 
space, as Kant describes it. Riemann is actively structuring physical space as a specific 
manifold by focusing on some key observed properties which are turned into “added 
hypotheses” (thus, the title of his Habilitationsvortrag:  Über die Hypothesen, welche der 
Geometrie zu Grunde liegen). The task then consists in making these regularities 
explicit.  With the proviso that “These matters of fact are—like all matters of 
fact—not necessary, but only of empirical certainty; they are hypotheses” [(Diese 
Tatsachen sind wie alle Tatsachen nicht notwendig, sondern nur von empirische Gewissheit, sie 
sind Hypothesen].11  
 
What becomes of things if such a view of space is adopted? Remember that 
classical physics (from Galileo on) relies on the seizure of things by space (meaning 
a given entity, the geometry of which had been spontaneously identified with 
Euclidean geometry. Physics had relied for its objectivity and certainty on such an 
identification: planes in physical space, just to mention one instance, were implicitly 
supposed to be perfect Euclidean planes, perfectly flat.  What happens if it is found 
that physical planes are not ideally plane, but curved (a question Riemann inherited 
from Gauss who had already empirically investigated it). One would expect that 
                                                
11.Riemann, 14. 
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Riemann’s destruction of Euclidean space as an absolute source of certainty would 
result in invalidating the whole project (Entwurf) of mathematical physics as it had 
been carried out up to then. In particular, what would happen to the 
transformation of things into geometrical objects, which had been so efficient in 
separating substantial characteristics of things from other qualities?  
At this point, in order to give a better account of how catastrophic the 
situation was as far as physics was concerned, I must add something to my 
previous account of Riemann’s Habilitationsvortrag, something I had postponed for 
the sake of clarity. This something deals with the concept of distance between two 
points in a given space, what mathematicians call its metrics. In Euclidean space, 
such a quantity is absolute, meaning independent of the positions of the two points 
in space, invariant under a shift of the two points from here to there. In the project 
of mathematical physics, in its original form, this property of invariance is 
transferred to the distance separating two “things” This is possible because the 
substantial properties of things are disconnected from their spatial locations. But, if 
physical space is not identified with Euclidean space (and its geometry), there is no 
reason why this should still be the case. In fact, as Riemann has shown in its 
Habilitationsvortrag, the distance between two “points” of a manifold is generally not 
independent of their (global) position in space; it depends on what Riemann calls 
“the binding forces which act upon space” (wirkende bindende Kräfte),12 something 
which is not included in the concept of space, something outside of it (ausserhalb). 
Applied to physical space, to that which accommodates things), this means that the 
very disconnection of substantial from spatial properties of things might become 
problematic. The whole enterprise of mathematical physics seems to fall apart. 
 
**** 
Equivalence 
                                                
12 Riemann, p. 17. Once more Riemann and Heidegger use the same words 
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I am now going to explain how the mathematical Entwurf or project, which 
really got into trouble when it was realized that space was not what people had 
thought it was, got out of this trouble. As we shall see, it did so only by rushing 
headlong into more abstract mathematics.  
“Equivalence” is the key to the way out, as physicists came to realize many 
years later, in the second half of the twentieth century. Explaining how the concept 
of equivalence was introduced will give the answer to the questions I previously 
asked when examining Heidegger’s account of the role played by mathematics in 
physics: 1) What does he mean by Dingheit? and 2) How is it that Euclidean space is 
(or was) particularly suitable for grasping things in their Dingheit?   
Since this is not so easy to articulate, I am going to proceed in steps, which 
carries the risk of being too formal, or too military. 
 
1. Res 
As we know, the word “thing” (“Ding”, “chose”, “cosa” in modern European 
languages) is the standard translation for the Latin word “res”. One of the 
characteristics of this word, much commented upon, is that it is ambiguous and 
indeterminate and that this semantic indeterminacy explains why the notion has 
become so important. Although this indeterminacy has many sides, one of them 
has played a decisive role in the history of mathematics, namely the fact that what is 
implied in the word “res” is at the same time definite and indefinite, individual and 
general – which Avicenna (Ibn-Sina) explains using the example of the horse: “in 
itself equinitas [meaning “horseness,” derived from equinus] is neither one nor 
many.”13 This is the first point: things are neither one nor many. 
Let me just open a brief parentheses before I proceed to the second point: it 
has been proposed14 that the kind of ontology implied by the example of equinitas 
                                                
13 “Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliud nisi equinitas tantum; ipas enim in se nec est multa nec est unum” Avicenna latinus, Liber de 
philosophia prima, sive sciencia divina, 3  éd. S. van Riet, 228, 229-36, t. 1,  234, Louvain-Leyde : Brill, 1977-1983. Cited in 
the entry « Res » Vocabulaire Européen des Philosophies, B. Cassin (dir), Paris : Editions du Seuil/Le Robert, 2004. 
14 See R. Rashed, “Mathématique et philosophie chez Avicenne”, in J. Jolivet, R. Rashed, Etudes sur Avicenne, Paris, 
Les Belles Lettres, 1984, 29-35.   
 
10
Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 21
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/21
 11 
(an ontology expressed in the term shay’iyya or thingness in Arabic)  was at the root 
of  algebra, which developed independently of Greek epistemology in the Arabic 
word, as a science common to both arithmetic  and geometry, a science where the 
unknown   “x” can be either a number or a geometrical magnitude. I mention this 
just to suggest that this might contribute to answering the unanswered question: 
how is it that physics which started as geometric ended as algebraic. 
 
2. What is so special about Euclidean space?  
I come to my second point. Although this is not a common view on 
Euclidean space, one must realize that being one and many (or rather neither one nor 
many is precisely what characterizes points of Euclidian space. In Euclidean space, 
“‘Here’ is nothing by itself that might differ from any other ‘Here’”; all “Heres” are 
equivalent, not identical but equivalent.  
Suppose I ask you the question: how do you define a point in Euclidean 
space? Having gone to school and studied elementary geometry, you will probably 
give the right answer: “I choose a reference system, meaning three perpendicular 
axes along which coordinates (Cartesian coordinates) can be measured; then I 
ascribe numerical values to these three coordinates; they uniquely determine a 
point.” Okay. But are you sure the point thus arrived at is uniquely determined? No 
it is not.  You (rightly) said: I first choose a reference system. An entirely free choice. 
You could have chosen any other frame of reference; it would serve equally well. 
That is what I mean when I say points in Euclidean space are all equivalent. They 
are at the same time one (I can put my finger on it) and many (they are not 
uniquely determined), neither really one nor really many.  
This is of paramount importance. For it is precisely what makes the 
mathematical Entwurf, as it is described by Heidegger, feasible.  With a same 
“thing” (with a set of given substantial coefficients) different equivalent points 
(spatial locations) may be associated – a state of affairs that is usually referred to as 
the relativity of positions.  That the point associated with a given “thing” is not 
11
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unique but part of a class of equivalent points is what allows the connection of 
“things” to points in Euclidean space. Points in Euclidean space share with 
“things” the faculty of being at the same time singular and multiple, “one” and 
“many.” To both of them, “things” and points in Euclidean space, can be 
attributed the property Avicenna calls thingness. There lies -- in the fact that things 
and points in Euclidean space enjoy the same thingness,15 -- the effectiveness of 
Euclidean geometry as a tool for changing things into objects, the faculty of 
jumping over things themselves in direction of their thingness or Dingheit. Dingheit is 
just that: the property of being one and many. This I identify with equivalence. 
 
3. Equivalence regained 
I now come to my third point. Euclidian space is, as Riemann has shown, a 
very special case of space: homogeneous, isotropic, with zero curvature and so on. 
The question then is whether equivalence -- that property of points that allows one 
to grasp directly the fact that things are at the same time one and many –  specific 
to Euclidean space?  In such a case, the mathematical Entwurf would be hopeless. 
Unless the equivalence of points can be regained within the framework of the 
Riemannian concept of space.  
Let us look at equivalence in more detail. Equivalence can be given a precise 
mathematical treatment in terms of “transformations”, i.e. one-to-one mappings. 
When we say that points in Euclidian space are all equivalent, we mean that, given 
any two points, A and B, there always is a point transformation carrying A into B 
which leaves the basic relations (continuity, connectivity, metric and so on) of 
Euclidean space unchanged. Since A and B are any two points (in Euclidean space), 
this means that in that case there exists a lot (an infinity) of transformations 
(translations, rotations, in fact all possible geometrical “displacements”) that 
transform Euclidean space in itself, or as we say, leave it invariant (we start with 
Euclidian space and the result is Euclidean space itself). 
                                                
15 (Note that neither points in Euclidean space nor things are completely determined by this property). 
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There is no reason why the notion of invariance, should be restricted to 
Euclidean space. All the more, since physical space according to Riemann is not 
given but must be constructed, which implies that we can choose to construct it in 
such a way that invariance is structurally included in its construction. Now, physical 
space, in Riemann’s view, is constructed by adding hypotheses, each one originating 
in a selected “matter of fact,” Tatsache, (selected for its empirical certainty). What 
characterizes such an empirically certain “matter of fact” is that it can be observed 
(wahrgenommen), meaning that, under certain conditions (those of observation), it is 
unchanged. Which, in mathematical terms, amounts to requiring that certain 
transformations that bring physical space onto itself leave that “matter of fact” 
unchanged, invariant. It can be shown that these transformations form what is 
called a group, in the mathematical sense of the word: two such transformations 
amount to a transformation of the same kind; to each transformation can be 
associated its inverse; there exists a transformation which changes nothing: identity. 
We come to the conclusion that to each Tatsache to be considered when following 
Riemann’s prescription for constructing physical space, there corresponds a group 
of transformations that leave the space being built invariant. 
As Hermann Weyl puts it: “We start with a group   of transformations. It 
describes, as it were, to what degree our point field (space) is homogeneous. Once 
the group is given, we know what “equivalent” means. …”16  In other words, we know how 
to connect things to elements (let us call them “points”), having the same thingness 
faculty of being one and many. “Doing physics” then amounts to looking for 
relations that are invariant under all transformations of group   ; some people 
might wish to call them “real” (or even “true”). 
 
As a consequence, the primary task in theoretical physics is to identify the 
right space, that is to say, the right group of transformations  , and therefore, the 
right “matter of fact,” that is, the one that is determinant. As Riemann pointed out, 
                                                
16 Hermann Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science. Trans. Olaf Helmer. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1949 [1927], 73. 
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the space thus chosen has no absolute certainty, no necessity. Should we say that it 
must only be convenient? I am not going to discuss that issue today. I just want to 
give two examples. In special relativity the relevant space is the one which is 
invariant under the Lorentz group (Lorentz transformations of Minkowski’s 
spacetime), the matter of fact being the principle of relativity restricted to a class of 
reference systems (inertial or Galilean reference systems). In general relativity, the 
space which has been found to be adequate is a Riemannian space whose curvature 
depends on the distribution of energy – the corresponding “matter of fact” being 
the generalized principle of relativity.17 In dealing with Quantum Mechanics, the 
space which is convenient is the more abstract, Hilbert space, in which some 
invariances (space, time invariances, the principle of relativity in its special or 
general form) are imposed. In both cases, one looks for relations (laws) which are 
invariant under the transformations of the groups which determine this adequate 
space. In other words: the equivalence of points in space -- the necessary condition 
for transforming things into geometrical objects and touching upon their Dingheit-- 
is regained, although in a restricted way compared to the general equivalence which 
structures Euclidean space. 
*** 
 
Invariance, symmetry, transformations, group, equivalence and all that 
Let me summarize: mathematical physics (as it was launched by Galileo) 
relies on the possibility of grasping the Dingheit of things, (i.e., the fact that a thing, 
among other properties, is at the same time one and many) in the web of a space. I 
say a space although initially the space involved was unique, namely Euclidean, 
space. We are lucky that the realization (with Riemann) that physical space is not 
identical with Euclidean space, did not wreck the whole enterprise initiated by 
Galileo. The reason for this is 1) the realization  that the only important 
characteristics of Euclidean space, as far as the enterprise of physics is concerned, 
                                                
17 Weyl,104. 
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is that its points are equivalent (and thus one and many, the same way things are); 
only the existence of equivalent points is needed in order to capture  the Dingheit of 
things; 2) that such a requirement (the existence of equivalent “points” ) is, so to 
speak, automatically fulfilled if one holds to the Riemannian way of constructing 
physical space, starting from a choice of empirical data.  
As we can see, equivalence is the key notion in post-Riemannian physics. 
Related to it is the notion of transformation: objects (points) are equivalent not in 
abstracto but as far as certain transformations of the set they belong to (the space) 
are concerned. Note that transformation is a notion that was unknown to classical 
geometry which only considered figures related to one another through kinship: 
equality, similarity, etc. The notion of transformation changes that of space which 
is no longer considered a collection of points, but is now seen as a structure that 
can be applied to itself, and therefore remains invariant as a whole through a definite 
set of transformations.  
We owe to Felix Klein and Sophus Lie the realization that transformations 
can be studied as such: they have shown that two transformations commute, that 
their combination results in a transformation of the same kind – in other words 
that the concept of group invented 175 years ago by Évariste Galois in an algebraic 
context, applies to them.  Equivalence, transformation, invariance and group now form an 
epistemological constellation. To which it is easy to add another notion: symmetry, a 
common notion18 which acquires a more precise and mathematical definition 
involving the terms “transformation” and “invariance.”  A symmetry (note the 
indefinite pronoun “a”) is a transformation that globally leaves invariant the 
relevant structure.”19  
 Today, “symmetry” has become the general word for this constellation: 
invariance, group of transformations, equivalence.  
                                                
18 The word “symmetry” (and even more the adjective “symmetrical”) belong to our ordinary vocabulary; we say that 
a cube and a sphere are symmetrical. But if you think a while about it you will rapidly see that the common language 
is not precise enough. For instance a cube may be said to be symmetrical in different ways: by tilting over one of its 
faces, by turning it  upside down. The specification to be added to the word “symmetrical” is always an operation, in 
other words, a transformation 
19 B. van Frassen, Laws and symmetries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 388. 
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The Identity of things: a contemporary perspective 
Up to now I have focused on how things are caught by space (a new concept 
of space) in their Dingheit. Once this problem is solved (or satisfactorily solved), 
there remains the problem of completing their characterization; let us recall that the 
problem was solved in classical physics by the mere adjunction of “substantial 
coefficients” to points in space (Euclidean space). How are these characterizations 
going to evolve in the new context of symmetry? 
The answer relies on two fundamental theorems due to Emmy Noether 
published in 1918.20  Emmy Noether has shown that for a system exhibiting a 
certain group of symmetry, to each of the transformations of that group, there 
corresponds a quantity which is invariant – or, in physical terms, there corresponds 
a magnitude relative to the system that retains the same value under the 
transformations of the group. In other words, a certain physical quantity (or 
magnitude) is “conserved” when the system itself undergoes the corresponding 
changes. More practically, this implies that these quantities can be observed, and 
measured. This is the reason why they are very often called “observables”. 
This will be more understandable if I give an example. Consider the 
symmetry called “invariance under space translation” which is the way the 
hypotheses of homogeneity of space (things behave the same way here as in Tokyo 
or on the Moon) is translated into the language of symmetries and invariance, the 
new language of physics. According to Noether’s theorem, to that invariance there 
corresponds a conserved magnitude for any system, anything placed in such a 
homogeneous space. It can be shown that this magnitude which keeps the same 
value under any change of the thing in that homogeneous space, is what is called 
impulsion, or linear momentum, in classical mechanics. As in the case of the 
supposed isotropy of space, there corresponds the fact that, for any system 
imbedded in such a space, the magnitude which is usually called “angular 
                                                
20 E. Noether, “Invariante Variationsprobleme,”,Königliche Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften Nachrichten. Math.-
Phys. Klasse, n°2 1918,  235.  
16
Décalages, Vol. 2 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 21
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol2/iss1/21
 17 
momentum” is conserved, keeps the same value while the thing itself undergoes 
changes in that space. Such magnitudes which keep a constant value while the thing 
undergoes changes can rightly be considered as part of the identity of the thing, its 
ID. 
The same can be said for less intuitive symmetries, like for instance the 
invariance which is called “gauge invariance” to which there corresponds a 
conservation of electric charge. This last example is instructive since it makes it 
obvious that what used to be called a substantial characteristic in the former view 
of things, now comes out of an invariance (or symmetry) property. The same holds 
if we now consider, not only continuous symmetries, but also discrete symmetries, 
such as parity (equivalence in mirror image, or change in the directions of space), 
inversion of time, charge conjugation (going from matter to anti-matter), etc. 
It should be noted that all these ID characteristics are related to things as 
being imbedded in (a) space, not things in themselves – which we know has no 
place in the mathematical Entwurf launched in the seventeenth century. As you 
probably know, the main problem facing theoretical physics today is how to unify 
quantum mechanics and general relativity (in other words, gravitation theory).  A 
unification along the lines I have just sketched out, i.e. based on Finding a general 
group of symmetries the sub-groups of which would include quantum mechanics (I 
should say mechanics, because one of the most impressive results of this approach 
is that the same symmetries hold for quantum and classical physics) and general 
relativity.  String theory (or supersymmetric strings) seems to be the best way to 
achieve such a unification. But… 
In this talk, I wanted to discuss two points which I think are not sufficiently 
commented on outside the cenacle of mathematicians and physicists. 
1)    space (whatever be its definition) is a non-avoidable ingredient of 
phenomena; they occur in space; things are embedded in space; there is 
no way to ignore it. Riemann was a pioneer in the investigation of how 
17
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the behavior of things (matters of facts, phenomena) and the geometrical 
structure of space are intertwined; 
2)   group theory, because it touches upon both geometry and arithmetic 
(through the concept of conservation, as investigated by E. Noether), has 
replaced (and complicated) the classical grasp of things by means of 
Euclidean space and arithmetic substantial coefficients. 
Paraphrasing the title given by one of my colleagues, Francis Bailly, who 
recently died, to one of his papers.21 I shall conclude with the following statement: 
the history of physics during the last decades can be identified with the emergence 
of invariance and the change of scientific thought from substantial conservation to 
formal invariance.  
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
                                                
21 F. Bailly, “About the emergence of invariances in physics: from substantial conservation to formal invariance”, in 
Quantum Mechanics, Mathematics, Cognition and Action, M. Mugur-Schächter and A. van der Merwe, eds. Dordrecht and 
Kluwer, 2002. 
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